Guy Sileo, Jr. v. Superintendent Somerset SCI by unknown
2017 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-26-2017 
Guy Sileo, Jr. v. Superintendent Somerset SCI 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017 
Recommended Citation 
"Guy Sileo, Jr. v. Superintendent Somerset SCI" (2017). 2017 Decisions. 580. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017/580 
This July is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2017 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
 
 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 15-3891 
_____________ 
 
GUY SILEO, JR., 
                        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
 SUPERINTENDENT SOMERSET SCI; THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE  
 COUNTY OF MONTGOMERY; THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE  
 OF PENNSYLVANIA  
_____________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. Civ. Action No. 2-12-cv-03803) 
District Judge: Honorable Joel H. Slomsky 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
November 4, 2016 
______________ 
 
Before: JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and RENDELL, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: July 26, 2017) 
 
______________ 
 
 OPINION*   
______________ 
 
 
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 
In this ineffective assistance of counsel case, Guy Sileo, Jr., Appellant, appeals 
from the denial of his Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.  For the reasons set forth 
below, we affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
I. BACKGROUND 
On December 26, 1996, Jim Webb was murdered on the third floor of the General 
Wayne Inn (“Inn”) in Lower Merion, Pennsylvania between 7:00 PM and 12:00 AM.  On 
August 1, 2001, a jury found Appellant guilty of Webb’s murder in the first degree and of 
possessing an instrument of a crime.  
Since that time, Appellant has challenged his sentence in three ways.  First, with a 
counsel different from the one who represented him at trial, he filed a direct appeal that 
raised eighteen arguments.  The state courts rejected each of these arguments.  None of 
these arguments are before us.   
Second, after having failed on his direct appeal, Appellant filed a timely Post 
Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) petition.  In that petition, Appellant sought relief on six 
grounds.  The state courts found these grounds unpersuasive.  One of these arguments is 
before us. 
Third, after he exhausted his state remedies, Appellant filed the instant Petition for 
a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  The District Court referred the 
case to a magistrate judge, who recommended that the District Court deny the Petition.  
The District Court adopted the recommendation.  Appellant sought a Certificate of 
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Appealability and we granted the request to one question: “[W]hether appellant was 
prejudiced by the absence of [an alibi] instruction in light of the prosecutor’s arguments 
at closing . . . .”  App. 46.   To that question, we now turn.  
II. JURISDICTION 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The parties do not agree on the proper standard of review.  They agree that 
Appellant raised this issue in front of the state courts in his PCRA petition and that the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (the “AEDPA”) applies and 
denies relief sought on the merits unless the state court decision “was contrary to, or 
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined 
by the Supreme Court of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or “was based on an 
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State 
court proceeding[s],” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).   
The parties disagree about whether the second exemption applies.1  For the 
purposes of this appeal, we need not resolve this debate because, even under the less 
deferential de novo test, Appellant’s argument fails.   
                                                 
1 Appellant concedes that the first exception to AEDPA, § 2254(d)(1), does not 
apply because he did not raise it on appeal and because appellants generally waive issues 
that they do not reference in their opening briefs.  See, e.g., FDIC v. Deglau, 207 F.3d 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
To claim the denial of effective counsel, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, 
Appellant must prove that the “representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.”  McAleese v. 
Mazurkiewicz, 1 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 1993).  To prove prejudice, Appellant must show 
“a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.”  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 
(1984).  To meet this threshold, “The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, 
not just conceivable,” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112 (2011), and, “In making 
this determination, a court hearing an ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality of 
the evidence before the judge or jury.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695.  Finally, “If it is 
easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice . 
. . that course should be followed.”  Id. at 697.  Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s 
instruction, we decide Appellant’s claim on the test’s second prong. 
Appellant argues that his trial counsel ineffectively represented him because the 
trial counsel presented an alibi defense but failed to request an alibi instruction and 
because the Commonwealth exploited this error by shifting the burden of proof onto 
Appellant.   
                                                                                                                                                             
153, 169 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating that if appellants “did not raise this issue in their opening 
brief on appeal[,] [t]hey have therefore waived it, and we will not address it”).   
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This argument fails.  Under Pennsylvania law, “[A] trial court, faced with alibi 
evidence, should instruct a jury generally that it should acquit if [defendant’s] alibi 
evidence, even if not wholly believed, raise[s] a reasonable doubt of his presence at the 
scene of the crime at the time of its commission and, thus, of his guilt.”  Commonwealth 
v. Hawkins, 894 A.2d 716, 717–18 (Pa. 2006) (alterations in original) (footnote omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Pennsylvania’s highest court requires this alibi 
instruction because “infer[ing] guilt based upon a failure to establish an alibi contravenes 
the presumption of innocence and the Commonwealth’s burden of proving the offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. at 718 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
Appellees argue that Appellant failed to present an alibi defense and, as a result, 
that the obligation to provide an alibi instruction never arose.  As Appellees concede, 
however, Pennsylvania’s intermediate court of review held that Appellant had provided 
sufficient evidence to raise an alibi defense at trial.  We need not resolve this dispute 
because Appellant’s claim fails even if his trial counsel did present an alibi defense.   
Appellant has not provided any evidence that the missing alibi instruction played a 
conceivable—let alone a substantial—role in the jury’s decision and that adding a proper 
alibi instruction would have affected the outcome in any way.  We have previously 
rejected similarly unsubstantiated pleas for relief.  Palmer v. Hendricks, 592 F.3d 386, 
394 (3d Cir. 2010) (rejecting an ineffective assistance of counsel claim because “[w]hat is 
not fleshed out in the petition, however, is a factual basis suggesting that [Petitioner] was 
prejudiced by his attorney’s alleged conduct” (second emphasis added)); Thomas v. 
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Horn, 570 F.3d 105, 122 (3d Cir. 2009), as corrected (July 15, 2009) (finding that 
defendant had not proven prejudice because “[Petitioner] has provided not a shred of 
evidence suggesting any probability that, had his trial counsel life-qualified every juror, at 
least one juror would have voted to sentence [Petitioner] to life imprisonment” (emphasis 
added)); Fahy v. Horn, 516 F.3d 169, 198 (3d Cir. 2008) (“agree[ing] with the District 
Court that [Petitioner] has not presented evidence of a reasonable probability that, despite 
the strength of the other evidence . . . , the exclusion of the confession would have altered 
the results of the trial” (emphasis added)). 
Indeed, contrary to Appellant’s argument, the available evidence suggests that the 
jury may have dismissed the alibi defense altogether; hence, the absence of an alibi 
instruction.  The strength of the alibi defense rested largely on the jury’s perception of 
Appellant’s credibility.  The jury could have reasonably questioned Appellant’s 
credibility because Appellant had been convicted of perjury when he lied about owning a 
gun that was implicated in Webb’s murder.  Because Appellant had already committed 
perjury, the jury may have ignored the alibi defense entirely.  
Even if the absence of an alibi instruction did have a conceivable impact on the 
jury’s decision, this impact did not make the likelihood of a different result substantial 
because the Commonwealth presented overwhelming evidence of Appellant’s guilt.   
In the District Court, the Magistrate Judge detailed the evidence presented at trial 
and reviewed each aspect that supported the jury’s verdict, and concluded that “[t]he 
verdict here was not ‘weakly supported by the record.’”  Sileo v. Rozum, 2014 WL 
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10741099 at *20 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 22, 2014) (quoting Rolan v. Vaughn, 445 F.3d 371, 681 
(3d Cir. 2006), adopted by Sileo v. Rozum, 2015 WL 7444820 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 24, 2015)).  
“Rather, the jury was presented with a substantial quantum of evidence of Petitioner’s 
guilt from a variety of sources.”  Id.  The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s 
Report and Recommendation.  Although the District Court noted a few factual 
discrepancies in the Magistrate Judge’s Report, it agreed with the Magistrate Judge’s 
views of the record’s clear support for the verdict.  We agree with the Magistrate and 
District Court Judges.  Assuming a de novo standard, we now review this evidence, albeit 
in a summary fashion.  
 First, the Commonwealth presented evidence of Appellant’s financial motivations 
for murdering Webb.  Webb and Appellant purchased the Inn together as business 
partners in 1995 for $1,286,000.  To finance the purchase, they borrowed over a million 
dollars and received a $100,000 payment from Appellant’s father.  Webb bought a 
$650,000 life insurance plan and made the partnership’s creditors the highest priority 
beneficiaries.  In 1996, Webb and Appellant opened the Inn.  The Inn showed early signs 
of insolvency and Appellant asked Webb to sign a document that characterized the 
father’s payment as a loan, rather than as a gift.  Webb refused to sign the document.  
After Webb’s death and as the partnership’s surviving partner, Appellant signed the 
document himself and turned the father into a creditor.  As one of the partnership’s 
creditors, the father could then claim a portion of Webb’s life insurance plan.  After 
Webb’s death, the Inn received a large infusion of cash from Webb’s life insurance plan 
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and approximately $215,000 remained from the plan to satisfy other business debts, like 
the one purportedly owed to Appellant’s father.  These financial windfalls, precipitated 
by Webb’s death, constituted financial motivations for murdering Webb, according to the 
Commonwealth.  
Second, the Commonwealth proffered evidence of Appellant’s personal 
motivation for killing Webb.  By the time of Webb’s death, his relationship with 
Appellant had deteriorated and had become hostile.  Webb’s sister testified that Webb 
told Appellant that he would not pay Appellant because he neglected his professional 
duties, drank excessively, and engaged in an extramarital affair.  Webb’s wife testified 
that Webb and Appellant “were not getting along” and the two physically fought in the 
Inn.  App. 9.  This animosity could have motivated Appellant to kill Webb, the 
Commonwealth argued.  
Third, the Commonwealth provided evidence that Appellant had planned Webb’s 
murder.  A bartender at a bar frequented by Appellant testified that Appellant asked him, 
weeks before the murder, “[D]o you know of countries that we don’t have any extradition 
treaties with, like if you wanted to—where—somewhere you could hide-out if you 
wanted to kill somebody[?]”  App. 13.  Similarly, the Inn’s pastry chef swore during the 
trial that Appellant told her two to three weeks before the murder, “I really feel like I 
need to shoot someone.”  App. 29.  The Commonwealth presented this testimony as 
evidence of Appellant’s plan to murder Webb.   
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Fourth, the Commonwealth offered evidence that Appellant determined, despite 
ambiguous evidence, that a murder had occurred before a police investigation and a 
trained nurse had seen the same evidence and had assumed that the victim had had an 
accident.  Appellant discovered Webb’s body on the third floor of the Inn when he 
arrived at work on the day after the murder.  Appellant told the Inn’s pastry chef, a 
registered nurse, that Webb had died and that they should call the police.  The pastry chef 
ran upstairs, found Webb’s body, and called the police.  On the phone with the 911 
operator, the pastry chef reported that Webb had “fallen and hit his head.”  Transcript of 
Notes of Testimony at 84, Sileo v. Rozum, No. CV 12-3803, 2015 WL 7444820 (E.D. Pa. 
Nov. 24, 2015), ECF. No. 29.  At trial, the pastry chef explained that she had concluded 
that Webb had merely fallen because “he did not have a visible wound but had blood 
coming out of his nose and mouth” and because “[h]is head was very close to the desk.”  
Id.  When police officers arrived and saw Webb’s body, they came to a similar 
conclusion because they noticed a large bulge on Webb’s forehead and did not see a 
weapon.   
Despite the absence of a weapon, the large bulge on Webb’s forehead, and the 
short distance between Webb’s body and the table, Appellant told one of the officers that 
someone had killed Webb and later informed Webb’s wife that “Jim’s been shot.”  App. 
11.  An innocent man would likely not have known about the murder’s existence when a 
trained nurse and law enforcement officers had failed to discern the actual cause of 
Webb’s death.  Appellant’s knowledge, the Commonwealth argued, proved his guilt. 
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Fifth, the Commonwealth submitted evidence that Appellant spread 
misinformation about the murder’s investigation.  When local police officers arrived at 
the crime scene, they found expensive wine in the bar, thousands of dollars in the Inn’s 
safe, over five hundred dollars in Webb’s pocket, and a gold chain around his neck.  Yet, 
Appellant told an officer and later friends that it must have been a robbery because wine 
was missing.    
Similarly, Appellant shared erroneous information with the officers investigating 
the murder by denying that he possessed a weapon that could have fired the murder 
bullet.  Appellant told investigators and a grand jury that he only owned one .25-caliber 
pistol.  A wiretap, however, recorded Appellant admitting that he owned another .25-
caliber pistol, and Appellant was convicted of perjury.  During trial, the Commonwealth 
presented expert testimony that there was a high probability that the murder bullet and 
some bullets in Appellant’s recovered .25-caliber, Phoenix pistol had come from the 
same box of bullets and that a weapon, other than Appellant’s recovered .25-caliber 
pistol, had left imprints in Appellant’s holster and may have fired the murder bullet.2  The 
Commonwealth presented Appellant’s spread of misinformation and possession of the 
possible murder weapon as evidence of Appellant’s guilt.  
In response to this evidence, Appellant denied his guilt and recounted his story of 
purported innocence.  He claimed that he and the staff closed the kitchen at 8:30 PM and 
                                                 
2 In a Post-Trial Hearing, Appellant confirmed this physical evidence by admitting 
that his hidden .25-caliber pistol had fired the murder bullet but attempted to deny guilt 
by claiming that his former and now deceased girlfriend had pulled the trigger.     
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the rest of the restaurant at 9:30 PM.  After everyone but Webb, Appellant’s former 
girlfriend, and Appellant had left, the former girlfriend and Appellant asked Webb if he 
would like to join them at a local bar.  Webb denied the invitation.  Appellant drove the 
former girlfriend to her car in a nearby parking lot.  The former girlfriend turned on her 
car but the car stalled.  Appellant and the former girlfriend restarted the car and parted 
ways at approximately 10:00 PM.  The former girlfriend drove to a friend’s house.  
Appellant drove approximately eighteen minutes to a local bar and testified that he 
arrived at about 10:20 PM.  During the cross-examination, Appellant stated that no one 
could confirm where he was after the former girlfriend3 left the parking lot and before he 
arrived at the bar.  Appellant stayed at the local bar until around 11:00 PM.  A detective 
testified that Appellant had told a similar story when interviewed on the day after the 
murder.  Under Appellant’s timeline, he spent no time alone at the crime scene.  
The Commonwealth refuted Appellant’s timeline by presenting evidence to 
question Appellant’s representations of when the former girlfriend and Appellant left the 
parking lot.  The Commonwealth undermined Appellant’s testimony about when the 
former girlfriend departed by examining the former girlfriend’s friend, whom the former 
girlfriend had visited on the night of the murder.  According to the friend, the former 
girlfriend must have left the parking lot at sometime between 9:45 PM and 10:00 PM 
because she had arrived at the friend’s house sometime between 10:00 PM and 10:15 PM 
                                                 
3 The former girlfriend passed away before trial. 
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and because it took approximately fifteen minutes to drive from the Inn to the friend’s 
house.   
The Commonwealth challenged Appellant’s testimony about when he left the 
parking lot by examining a bartender employed by the local bar.  According to the 
bartender, Appellant must have left the parking lot sometime between 10:12 PM and 
10:27 PM because Appellant arrived at the bar between 10:30 PM and 10:45 PM and 
because it takes approximately eighteen minutes to drive from the Inn to the local bar. 
During cross-examination, Appellant’s lawyer asked the bartender how he remembered 
this time and the bartender testified that he looked at the clock when Appellant arrived 
because “it was a slow night.”  Transcript of Notes of Testimony at 27, Sileo v. Rozum, 
No. CV 12-3803, 2015 WL 7444820 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 24, 2015), ECF. No. 36.  Under the 
Commonwealth’s timeline, Appellant spent between twelve and forty-two minutes alone 
at the crime scene.  Taken together, these facts amount to overwhelming evidence of guilt 
and a conclusion that the alibi evidence was weak.  
A. Appellant’s Counterarguments  
Appellant provides three counterarguments.  First, Appellant argues that the 
evidence of guilt could not have been overwhelming because it was circumstantial.  
Second, Appellant contends that the evidence of guilt could not have been overwhelming 
because the jury deliberated for seven hours and eight minutes before delivering a 
verdict.  Third, Appellant asserts that the alibi defense must have played a substantial role 
in the jury’s decision because the prosecution focused on it in its closing argument.   
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We find these three arguments unpersuasive.  Appellant’s first argument fails 
because we do not distinguish between circumstantial and direct evidence.  See, e.g., 
Lukon v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 131 F.2d 327, 329 (3d Cir. 1942) (“[C]ircumstantial 
evidence . . . . has probative value equal to that of testimonial evidence.”); see also Third 
Circuit Model Criminal Jury Instructions § 1.09 (“The law makes no distinction between 
the weight that you should give to either direct or circumstantial evidence.”).  
Similarly, Appellant’s second contention does not persuade because, as Appellant 
concedes, “[T]his Circuit has not specifically used the length of jury deliberations as a 
factor in assessing Strickland prejudice,” Appellant’s Br. at 18, and because the non-
binding circuit cases cited by Appellant all involve jury deliberations that lasted at least 
two days4—more than twice as long as the deliberations here.   
Appellant’s final assertion lacks merit because of a logical fallacy.  The 
prosecution’s focus on the alibi defense in its closing argument may prove the alibi 
defense’s strength relative to Appellant’s other arguments, assuming that the prosecution 
would focus its attention on the defense’s strongest arguments, but it cannot establish the 
alibi’s absolute strength.  Courts must consider prejudice in light of the totality of the 
evidence and not just relative to Appellant’s other defenses.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695. 
                                                 
4 Thomas v. Chappell, 678 F.3d 1086, 1093 (9th Cir. 2012) (five days of jury 
deliberations); Dugas v. Coplan, 428 F.3d 317, 335 (1st Cir. 2005) (three days); Silva v. 
Woodford, 279 F.3d 825, 829 (9th Cir. 2002) (two days); Mayfield v. Woodford, 270 F.3d 
915, 938 (9th Cir. 2001) (nearly two days); Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255 F.3d 926, 968 
(9th Cir. 2001) (two days). 
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As a result, showing the relative strength of Appellant’s alibi argument does little to 
further his claim.  For these reasons, we find Appellant’s counterarguments unavailing.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
 We affirm the District Court’s decision to deny Appellant’s Petition for a Writ of 
Habeas Corpus because Appellant has not proven, as required by Strickland, “a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.”  466 U.S. at 694.  
